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INTRODUCTION

The Bankruptcy Code1 allows debtors to be discharged 2 from
financial obligations when they become too burdensome, but it also
provides a number of special exemptions3 to ensure that this relief
is afforded to the "honest but unfortunate debtor."4 One exemp
tion, 11 U.S.c. § 523(a)(4), the focus of this Note, states that an
individual's debt will not be discharged for "defalcation while act
ing in a fiduciary capacity."5 This exemption has been at the root of
much judicial debate because courts disagree as to whether a fiduci
ary must have intent to commit defalcation. 6 For the debtor, the
difference between a standard of defalcation requiring intent and
1. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) and
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98
Stat. 33 (1984) (codified as amended at 11 u.s.c. §§ 101-133Q (2004)).
2. Theresa J. Pulley Radwan, Determining Congressional Intent Regarding Dis
chargeability of Imputed Fraud Debts in Bankruptcy, 54 MERCER L. REV. 987, 987-88
(2003) ("In exchange for participating ... in this orderly distribution of one's assets, a
debtor is given the ability to nullify all debts remaining after the distribution concludes,
known as a discharge.").
3. 11 U.S.c. § 523(a) (2004) (providing for nineteen exceptions to discharge in
cluding those for fraudulently filed taxes, false pretenses used to obtain credit, monies
owed for child support or alimony, money owed for willful or malicious injury to person
or property of another, etc.). See also Andrew Kessler, Exceptions to Discharge: The
Supreme Court Adopts A Preponderance of the Evidence Standard of Proof in Section
523 Proceedings, 15 NOVA L. REV. 1411, 1412 (1991).
4. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 287 (1991). See also Local Loan Co. v. Hunt,
292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (Bankruptcy "gives to the honest but unfortunate debtor ... a
new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort. ").
5. § 523(a) ("A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b) of
this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt ... (4) for fraud or
defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity, embezzlement, or larceny.").
6. See In re Baylis, 313 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 2002) ("The present range of interpre
tations of 'defalcation' among the circuits, [extends] from innocent mistake to a civil
recklessness."); see also Meyer v. Rigdon, 36 F.3d 1375, 1383 (7th Cir. 1994) ("[C]ourts
have split over the question of whether mere negligent acts may be 'defalcations."');
Reinhardt & Horlbeck, infra note 8, at 1774.
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one in which no intent is required is crucial. If no intent to commit
defalcation is necessary, then a debt created as a result of the fiduci
ary's mistake or negligence could be denied discharge. On the
other hand, if a creditor is forced to prove that the debtor intended
to commit a defalcation, there is a much higher standard for the
creditor to meet and more debts of the fiduciary would be
discharged.
The absence of a definition of "defalcation" in the Bankruptcy
Code7 has led to the popularity of the § 523(a)(4) exception
amongst creditors seeking to prevent a debtor from obtaining dis
charge, since it typically encompasses a vast array of conduct and
because a majority of courts have held that intent is not required. s
As a result, fiduciaries who cannot account for entrusted funds have
often been denied discharge for the debt in bankruptcy proceedings
for committing "defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity."9
Even innocent mistakes in accounting can prevent a fiduciary from
receiving a discharge. lO This Note, prompted by a recent First Cir
cuit case, addresses whether this lack-of-intent standard is appropri
ate to apply in § 523(a)(4) proceedings.ll
The current broad reach of § 523(a)(4) has given the courts the
difficult task of having to dissect a variety of factual circumstances
and, without a definition of "defalcation," determine whether a de
falcation was committed. Consider this simple example where an
attorney who is the trustee for a client's trust is holding $100,000 on
behalf of the trust. The trustee deposits the funds in a bank, which
appears on all accounts to be federally insured, but later goes bank
rupt and in fact, the bank was misrepresenting itself as federally
insured when it was not. After the trust wins a judgment against
the trustee, that trustee files for bankruptcy. Should the trustee be
denied discharge for committing defalcation while acting in a fiduci
ary capacity? What if the trustee deposits money in a bank which
does not advertise itself to be federally insured and this institution
7. See, e.g., In re Twitchell, 72 B.R. 431, 434 (Bankr. D. Utah 1987) ("The term
'defalcation' ... does not have a precise definition and no legislative history or com
ment exists to aid the interpretation. ").
8. Peter M. Reinhardt & William G. Horlbeck, Defalcation While Acting in a Fi
duciary Capacity: What Does it Mean?, 79 COLO. LAW. 1773, 1773 (1995).
9. Id. ("Creditors often prefer to assert the defalcation in a fiduciary capacity
exception because the term 'defalcation' has consistently been interpreted to encom
pass a wider spectrum of conduct ....").
10. In re Uwimana, 274 F.3d 806, 811 (4th Cir. 2001); In re Cochrane, 124 F.3d
978, 984 (8th Cir. 1997); In re Lewis, 97 F.3d 1182, 1186 (9th Cir. 1996).
11. Baylis, 313 F.3d at 17.
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goes bankrupt as well? Consider instead, that the trustee invests
the money in his own start-up company as a temporary loan, which
later fails and as a result the $100,000 is lost. Finally, imagine the
trustee takes the money outright, buys a vacation home, and refuses
to refund the trust funds. Courts must examine facts like these,
which will be revisited later, and determine in which, if any, of these
situations the trustee has committed defalcation that would prevent
a discharge under § 523(a)(4).
Adding to the confusion is the tension between the conflicting
purposes of the Bankruptcy Code: a fresh start for the "honest but
unfortunate debtor"12 versus repayment to similarly situated credi
tors.13 Those courts that favor a standard requiring a lower level of
intent (thereby making discharge more difficult for the debtor while
providing easier collection for creditors) agree that the need to hold
fiduciaries accountable in their special legal roles outweighs the de
sire for a fresh start policy.14 These courts maintain that one who
commits a defalcation while in a fiduciary capacity should not be
considered an "honest but unfortunate debtor" and that "the requi
site 'badness' ... is supplied by an individual's special legal status
with respect to another ...."15 On the other hand, the courts that
require some sort of wrongful intent on behalf of the debtor hold
the fresh start policy in very high regard and strictly construe excep
tions in favor of the debtor.1 6 These divergent approaches to policy
priorities have culminated in the current split among the circuit
courts over the question of whether defalcation under § 523(a)(4)
requires intent. While the circuit split is of considerable modern
day significance, its origins date back to the earlier part of the 20th
century.
The Second Circuit, in the 1937 decision in Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co. v. Herbst, first raised the possibility that an inno
cent default may be all that is required to constitute defalcation by
12. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 287 (1991); Mark S. Summers, The Exception
to Discharge in Bankruptcy for Defalcation by a Fiduciary, 92 COM. L.J. 314, 315 (1987).
13. Summers, supra note 12, at 314. Further, the conflict between that fresh start
policy and the continuingly expanding list of exceptions seemingly provides even less
optimism for reconciliation between these two policies. Compare 11 U.S.c. § 523(a)
(1988) with 11 U.S.c. § 523(a) (2003) (In 1988, there were ten exceptions to discharge;
today there are nineteen.).
14. In re Johnson, 691 F.2d 249, 256 (6th Cir. 1982).
15. /d.
16. Meyer v. Rigdon, 36 F.3d 1375, 1385 (7th Cir. 1994) ("[E]xceptions to dis
charge are strictly construed against the objecting creditor and in favor of the debtor.")
(citation omitted).
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suggesting that defalcation may include innocent defaults.17 Since,
courts have split on what standard, or level, of intent should be used
to determine whether a fiduciary has committed a defalcation pur
suant to § 523(a)(4).1 8 The camps of interpretation have variously
held that an innocent mistake, negligence, or recklessness consti
tutes defalcation.1 9 The Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits read the
open-ended question in Central Hanover in its broadest sense so
that a minute mistake will make a fiduciary's debts non-discharge a
ble. 20 The Tenth Circuit has rested with the notion that negligence
on the part of a fiduciary will constitute defalcation.21 Thus, four
circuits, the Fourth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth, do not require any
specific intent or motive on behalf of the debtor.
In contrast, three circuits require intent. The Fifth and Seventh
Circuits each require a standard similar to recklessness, that of will
ful neglect. 22 The First Circuit was confronted with this issue for
the first time in 200223 and held that "defalcation requires some
degree of fault, closer to fraud, without the necessity of meeting a
strict specific intent requirement. "24
This Note examines the issue central to this circuit split:
whether defalcation under § 523(a)(4) requires intent on the part of
the debtor in order for a debt to be denied discharge. Part I of this
Note will give a background of the Bankruptcy Code, a history of
the evolution of its envisioned purposes and an introduction to dis
charge and defalcation. Part II will introduce the principal cases
throughout the circuits that have split on this issue. Part III will
17. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Herbst, 93 F.2d 510, 511 (2d Cir. 1937)
("'[D]efa1cation,' ordinarily implies some moral dereliction, but in this context it may
have included innocent defaults ...."). But see infra note 97 and accompanying text
(the wording "in this context" seems to be directed toward the introductory use of
"defalcation" which was as a definition rather than as an exception).
18. In re Baylis, 313 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 2002); In re Storie, 216 B.R. 283, 287
(B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1997).
19. Baylis, 313 F.3d at 18.
20. In re Uwimana, 274 F.3d 806, 811 (4th Cir. 2001); In re Cochrane, 124 F.3d
978, 984 (8th Cir. 1997); In re Lewis, 97 F.3d 1182, 1186 (9th Cir. 1996).
21. Storie, 216 B.R. at 287 followed by In re Merrill, 252 B.R. 497, 506 (B.A.P.
10th Cir. 2000). See also In re Johnson, 691 F.2d 249, 256 (6th Cir. 1982) (promoting the
objective standard which is similar to that of the negligence standard in that the impor
tant legal status seemingly eradicates the need for intent or motive on the part of the
fiduciary).
22. Matter of Schwager, 121 F.3d 177, 185 (5th Cir. 1997); Meyer v. Rigdon, 36
F.3d 1375, 1385 (7th Cir. 1994) (each finding that a fiduciary's willful neglect of his
duties are not dischargeable).
23. Baylis, 313 F.3d at 16.
24. Id. at 18-19.
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present an analysis of § 523(a)(4), a discussion of defalcation, and a
determination of whether any level of intent is required for defalca
tion under § 523(a)(4). This Note will conclude with a recommen
dation that a standard of intent similar to willful neglect should be
used to determine whether a fiduciary has committed defalcation.
I.

BACKGROUND

This section will begin with an overview of bankruptcy's emer
gence into American law and the changes that took place in its con
version from English law. Continuing on this theme, the section
will examine the view in American bankruptcy law that honest
debtors should be afforded a fresh start and therefore be granted a
discharge from their debts. Next, exceptions to this discharge of
debt will be discussed, as well as the policies that underlie such ex
ceptions and the contradictions between these policies and the fresh
start policy. A discussion of the exception for "defalcation while
acting in a fiduciary capacity" will follow with an emphasis on its
ambiguity.
A.

History of the Bankruptcy Code and Discharge

The origins of American bankruptcy law are traced to English
bankruptcy law,25 the purpose of which was to promote commerce
by providing a means of collection for creditors. 26 Since only the
creditor could bring a charge of bankruptcy against a debtor, bank
ruptcy was involuntarily thrust upon the debtor. 27 In early English
bankruptcy law, the debtor received little mercy and severe punish
ment, often by imprisonment28 and occasionally even death,29 for
failure to pay his creditors. The type of debt or the intent of the
debtor was of no concern, only that the debt to the creditor re
mained outstanding. 30
The Constitution granted Congress the power to legislate on
25. Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United
States, 3 AM. BANKR. INsT. L. REV. 5, 7 (1995) [hereinafter The History of the Bank
ruptcy Laws].
26. Charles Jordan Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge,
65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 325, 327 (1991) [hereinafter Evolution of the Bankruptcy
Discharge).
27. Id. at 330.
28. Id. Bankruptcy was "quasi-criminal in nature." See also id. at 329 (articulat
ing that English law's first bankruptcy law, 34 & 35 Hen. 8, c. 4 (1542), was more of a
criminal statute).
29. Id. at 337.
30. Id. at 330-31.
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the subject of bankruptcy.31 Though the congressional power to
legislate in this area was established early on, the body of legislation
that has come to form bankruptcy law today developed slowly. In
the beginnings of American bankruptcy law, federal statutes were
sporadic32 and states freely enacted their own legislations33 that va
ried in severity.34 From 1800 to 1803, federal bankruptcy law
greatly resembled early English law and provided a low threshold
for discharge of a merchant's debt, but did not provide a remedy for
individual debtors. 35 Though discharge was, in general, readily pro
vided, the fraudulent debtor merchant was still subject to criminal
punishment. 36
The temporary legislation enacted in 184137 introduced the
revolutionary idea of voluntary bankruptcy for not only merchants,
but also individual debtors.38 For the first time, an individual could
use bankruptcy as a remedy to cure debt. The later Bankruptcy Act
of 1867 maintained the availability of voluntary bankruptcy and in
addition, it allowed corporations to apply for voluntary discharge. 39
Though the 1867 Act, like those before it, addressed a need for fed
eral bankruptcy laws (since state laws could not reach nonresident
debtors),40 congressional power to develop bankruptcy laws was
not fully exercised until more lasting federal legislation went into
31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, d. 4. In 1787, the Constitution empowered Congress
to pass "uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies." Id.
32. The History of the Bankruptcy Laws, supra note 25, at 13-14 (federal statutes
existed temporarily from 1800-1803, 1841-1843, and 1867-1878 with each following a
"major financial disaster").
33. Id. at 12-13.
34. Id. at 13 (stating that varying state bankruptcy laws made interstate com
merce difficult and unpredictable).
35. Id. at 17. See Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Herbst, 93 F.2d 510, 511 (2d
Cir. 1937) ("Under the Act of 1800, 2 Stat. 19, 30 (Section 34), a discharge relieved
bankrupts of all their debts without exception, provided they conducted themselves
properly; but the statute applied only to those engaged in commerce and was confined
to involuntary bankruptcies. ").
36. Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, supra note 26, at 336; see also The
History of the Bankruptcy Laws, supra note 25, at 14 (debtors were not subject to death
as under English bankruptcy law).
37. An Act to Establish a Uniform System of Bankruptcy throughout the United
States, Ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440, 441 (1841) (repealed 1843).
38. The History of the Bankruptcy Laws, supra note 25, at 17.
39. Ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517 (1867), repealed by Act of June 7, 1878, ch. 160,20 Stat.
99 (1878). See The History of the Bankruptcy Laws, supra note 25, at 19-21 (the 1867
Act also established the modern court system of bankruptcy giving district courts origi
nal jurisdiction as bankruptcy courts).
40. The History of the Bankruptcy Laws, supra note 25, at 19.
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effect in 1898.41 This legislation gave birth to "the modern era of
liberal debtor treatment in United States bankruptcy laws"42
marked by a limited number of exceptions to discharge. 43 The
Bankruptcy Code of 1898 firmly planted itself into American law
and continued until the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,44 which
has since been subject to a number of amendments. 45 American
bankruptcy law has thus evolved over time from its pro-creditor
stance, which criminalized debtors, into its modern day pro-debtor
rationale. 46

B. A Fresh Start for Honest Debtors
With the arrival of the modern era of bankruptcy came the
novel idea that the "honest but unfortunate debtor" should be af
forded a "fresh start" through the discharge of his debt, which
would, in turn, benefit both the debtor, by relieving him of his op
pressive debt, and society, by allowing the debtor to become pro
ductive once freed from this debt.47 The Bankruptcy Code allows
41. An Act to Establish a Uniform System of Bankruptcy Throughout the United
States, Ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898) (repealed 1979); The History of the Bankruptcy
Laws, supra note 25, at 13-14 (Prior to the 1898 legislation, federal bankruptcy laws
were in existence from 1800 to 1803 (a reprise of the old English bankruptcy model),
from 1841 to 1843 (broke new ground introducing voluntary bankruptcy) and again
from 1867 to 1878. From 1867 to 1878, corporations as well as individuals were allowed
to take advantage of bankruptcy laws.).
42. The History of the Bankruptcy Laws, supra note 25, at 24.
43. See id. at 24 n.153 (citing ch. 541, § 14, 30 Stat. at 550 (discharge granted
unless debtor commits crime or fraudulently conceals financial condition)). See also id.
at 19-20 (explaining how the 1898 law followed the 1878 repeal of the 1867 law, which
laid down so many exceptions for discharge that only one-third of debtors actually re
ceived discharge).
44. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549.
45. The History of the Bankruptcy Laws, supra note 25, at 32. See also S. REP.
No. 521-32 (1976) ("widely regarded as a debtor's bill").
46. Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, supra note 26, at 364.
47. [d. at 364-65. This was also thought to be a more humane view than previ
ously taken by the English model of bankruptcy. See id. at 364.
Under this bill no assent is required from the creditors. If the debtor has acted
dishonestly by committing certain acts forbidden in the bill he will not be dis
charged; if he has acted honestly he will be. The granting of a discharge is
justified by a wise public policy. The granting or withholding of it is depen
dent upon the honesty of the man, not upon the value of his estate.
Id. See also Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 660 (1971) ("[O]ne of the purposes of the
Bankruptcy Act is to 'relieve the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive indebted
ness and permit him to start afresh...."') (quoting Williams v. United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554-55 (1915)); Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention & Con
sumer Protection Act of 2001, H.R. REP. No. 107-3(1), at 6 (2001).
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for a "fresh start" either through a liquidation or reorganization. 48
Through liquidation, the debtor surrenders his or her property, un
less it is exempted, which is then liquidated and distributed amongst
his or her creditors. 49 Under reorganization, the debtor must follow
an approved, structured plan to reorganize his or her finances. 5o
Through either liquidation or reorganization, the major goal
for the debtor is to be discharged of his or her provable debts 51 and
freed from personal liability following the bankruptcy proceed
ings. 52 The fresh start that allows debtors to be relieved of their
debts and collection by creditors is, however, to be made available
only to honest debtors. 53 The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated
that the purpose of bankruptcy is to "relieve the honest debtor
from the weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit him to start
afresh .... "54 However, the current list of exceptions to discharge
48. 1 NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW & PRACTICE 2D § 3:10 (2003).
49. Id.
50. Id. A debtor may file for liquidation under Chapter 7 (liquidation) of the
Bankruptcy Code while reorganization, and payment through installments, is granted to
the debtor under Chapters 11 and 13 (reorganization). See Bradley Kendall Mahanay,
An Analysis of the Matter of Bennett and Its Effect on Non-Dischargeability of Debt for
Defalcation While Acting in a Fiduciary Capacity, 46 BAYLOR L. REv. 281, 283 (1994)
(Chapter 7 allows for discharge unless it is protested by a creditor, Chapter 11 provides
discharge to non-individual debtors after a plan is approved, and Chapter 13 grants
discharge after payments on the plan are concluded). See also Karen Gross, Preserving
a Fresh Start for the Individual Debtor: The Case for Narrow Construction of the Con
sumer Credit Amendments, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 59, 62-63 n.10 (1986) (explaining various
remedies to bankruptcy).
51. Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 U.S. 328, 331 (1934) ("The effect of a
discharge in bankruptcy is to 'release a bankrupt from all of his provable debts,' with
excepted liabilities enumerated in the statute.") (citing Bankruptcy Act § 17 (1867), 11
U.S.c. § 35 (1898».
52. See 3 NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW & PRACTICE 2D § 48:1, 48:2, 48:3 (2003)
(citing Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234,244 (1934) for the proposition that one of
the main purposes of bankruptcy is to provide a manner in which a debtor can be freed
from his creditors and enjoy "a new opportunity in life") [hereinafter 3 NORTON BANK
RUPTCY LAW]. Cf Charles G. Hallinan, The "Fresh Start" Policy in Consumer Bank
ruptcy: A Historical Inventory and an Interpretive Theory, 21 U. RICH. L. REV. 49, 54
(1986) (stating that the fresh start "was originally conceived not as a relief measure but
as a reward for the debtor's efforts to maximize the return to his creditors").
53. Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 502, 514 (1938) ("The develop
ment of bankruptcy legislation has been towards relieving the honest debtor from op
pressive indebtedness and permitting him to start afresh.").
54. Williams v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554-55 (1915). See,
e.g., Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286-87 (1991) ("But in the same breath that we
have invoked this 'fresh start' policy, we have been careful to explain that the Act limits
the opportunity for a completely unencumbered new beginning to the 'honest but un
fortunate debtor."') (citation omitted). See also H.R. REp. No. 523-14 (1977) (explain
ing "there is a Federal interest in seeing that a debtor that goes through bankruptcy
comes out with adequate possessions to begin his fresh start").
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is long, nineteen to be exact, and not all are based on debtors who
commit intentionally dishonest acts, such as fraud. 55 Others are re
lated to general policy categories, such as payment of alimony.56

Exceptions to Discharge and Balancing Bankruptcy Policies
The Bankruptcy Code 57 may deny a debtor discharge entirely
or may deny discharge on only a particular debt.58 Today, the
Bankruptcy Code may deny discharge of nineteen categories of
debt. 59 Provisions like 11 U.S.c. § 523(a) "create exceptions only
in situations where fairness to the parties warrants a deviation from
accepted bankruptcy policies,"60 meaning that in certain circum
stances the primary policy of a fresh start for the honest debtor is
outweighed either by the importance of the debt or a societal
goa1. 61 These exceptions to discharge exist either because forgive
ness of a certain type of debt ("type-based" exceptions), such as
child support payments, would impede a social policy, or because
C.

55. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) (2003).
56. § 523(a)(5); Grogan, 498 U.S. at 287.
57. The History of the Bankruptcy Laws, supra note 25, at 32 n.232 (noting the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 is often called "The Act" or "The Code").
58. Radwan, supra note 2, at 988 n.6 (11 U.S.c. §§ 727(a), 727(d), 1141(d)(3),
1228(b), 1228(d), 1328(b), and 1328(e) deny discharge completely and 11 U.S.C.
§§ 523(a), 1222(b), and 1322(b) deny specific debts from discharge).
59. § 523(a) (discharge will be denied for (1) debts for tax or customs duty; (2) for
money or property obtained fraudulently; (3) not listed at the time of filing for bank
ruptcy; (4) for fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity, embezzlement,
or larceny; (5) for alimony or child support; (6) for willful and malicious injury by the
debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity; (7) for fines or penalties
payable to the government; (8) for educational loan; (9) for death or personal injury
caused by driving while intoxicated; (10) for debts previously waived in a bankruptcy
proceeding; (11) arising from any act of fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary
capacity committed with respect to any depository institution or insured credit union;
(12) for malicious or reckless failure to fulfill any commitment by the debtor to a Fed
eral depository institutions regulatory agency to maintain the capital of an insured de
pository institution; (13) for any payment of an order of restitution issued under U.S.c.
title 18; (14) incurred to pay a nondischargeable tax; (15) incurred by a separation
agreement; (16) for condominium fees; (17) for court fees; (18) owed under state law or
to a municipality; (19) for violation of securities law).
60. Radwan, supra note 2, at 993-94. See also id. at 994 n.22 (quoting George H.
Singer, Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code: The Fundamentals of Nondischargeability
in Consumer Bankruptcy, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 325, 326 (1997)) ("The exceptions from
discharge are set forth at § 523 of the Bankruptcy Code and are essentially the product
of countervailing policy considerations in which the scales of justice tip in favor of cer
tain creditors by allowing enumerated categories of obligations to remain virtually un
scathed by the bankruptcy discharge.").
61. Radwan, supra note 2, at 1000 (stating that the two purposes of the exceptions
of 523 are "prevention of improper behavior by debtors and repayment of important
debts").
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the debt resulted from some immoral or dishonest act committed by
the debtor ("fault-based" exceptions),62 such as fraudulently filed
tax returns. 63 These § 523(a) exceptions deny discharge from debts
that would "violate the bankruptcy objective" if a discharge were
granted. 64
Bankruptcy law does not afford discharge that would not pro
mote the primary objective of granting a fresh start to the honest
debtor. 65 Thus, debts arising out of fraud,66 from the debtor's "will
ful and malicious" injury of person or property,67 and from personal
injury and wrongful death claims based on the debtor's drunk driv
ing are not dischargeable. 68 Bankruptcy law also denies discharge
to a debtor who has evaded an important social financial obliga
tion69 such as taxes,70 a divorce settlement,71 child support or ali
62. See In re Baylis, 313 F.3d 9, 19 (1st Cir. 2002) ("The other large category of
bankruptcy exceptions [aside from type-based exceptions] relies on fault.").
63. Id. at 18-19. The Baylis court suggests that type-based exceptions
include debts for: taxes or customs duties, § 523(a)(1), or debts incurred to pay
tax, § 523(a)(14); alimony and child support payments, § 523(a)(5); fines, pen
alties or forfeitures to the government, § 523(a)(7); educational loans made or
insured by the government or a nonprofit institution, § 523(a)(8); orders of
restitution, § 523(a)(13); court fees, § 523(a)(17); and support owed under
state law and enforceable under the Social Security Act, § 523(a)(18).
[d. at 19 (internal citations omitted). On the other hand, fault-based exceptions include
debts for "money, goods or services obtained by fraud or falsehood, § 523(a)(2); willful
and malicious injury, § 523(a)(6); death or injury caused by driving under the influence
of alcohol or drugs, § 523(a)(9) ...." [d.
64. A narrow set of specified types of claims, however, are 'nondischargeable'
in bankruptcy, which means that they remain owing to the creditor to the full
extent unpaid. These are claims for which discharge would violate the bank
ruptcy objective of giving a fresh start only to honest debtors (such as claims
relating to fraud, or claims for criminal restitution obligations to victims) or
which are considered to be of paramount societal importance (such as tax obli
gations, and alimony and child support.
Radwan, supra note 2, at 1000 (quoting H.R. REp. No. 102-1085, at 50-51 (1992); H.R.
REp. No. 103-835, at 3341-42 (1994)); cf Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2001, H.R. REp. No. 107-3 pt. 1, at 459 (2001); Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1999, H.R. REp. No. 106-123, pt. 1, at 387 (1999) ("The Bankruptcy Code does
not permit the discharge of certain debts whose payments are considered to be impor
tant to society. [Such debts include those] incurred through the debtor's misconduct,
such as debts arising from fraud and intentional injuries.").
65. Radwan, supra note 2, at 1000.
66. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) (2004).
67. § 523(a)(6).
68. § 523(a)(9); see Lawrence Kalevitch, Cheers? The Drunk-Driving Exception
to Discharge, 63 AM. BANKR. L.J. 213,217 (1989) (explaining that the reforms of 1978
require that exceptions for fraud (§ 523(a)(2)), fraud or defalcation while acting in a
fiduciary capacity (§ 523(a)(4)), and willful and malicious injury (§ 523(a)(6)) must be
adjudicated by the courts before an exception to discharge will be implemented).
69. Radwan, supra note 2, at 1000.
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mony,n or an educational benefit or loan.73 Therefore, exceptions
are designed either to promote the fresh start policy for "honest
debtors," by deterring people from acting dishonestly, or to protect
the interest of the creditor, by assuring that certain debts of impor
tance, as dictated by Congress, remain an obligation of the debtor. 74
D.

Confusion Surrounding the Defalcation Exception

The exception to discharge for "defalcation while acting in a
fiduciary capacity" does not so clearly fit into one of the two cate
gories of type-based debt, for which fault on behalf of the debtor is
not required, or fault-based debt, for which fault is required. 75 If
fault is required, then a fiduciary debtor committing defalcation
must have some sort of intent to do SO.76 On the contrary, if the
defalcation exception exists to promote the societal goal of ensuring
that the special legal status of a fiduciary is held to the highest stan
dards, then no intent would be required on behalf of the debtor.7 7
Much of the uncertainty surrounding this exception stems from the
fact that the Bankruptcy Code fails to provide definitions of "defal
cation" and "fiduciary" and further because legislative history sheds
little light on the terms.78
To prove that a defalcation exception under § 523(a)(4) ap
70. § 523( a )(1).
71. § 523( a )(15).
72. § 523(a)(5).
73. § 523(a)(8).
74. H.R. REp. No. 102-1085, at 50-1 (1992):
The first [objective of bankruptcy law] is to give honest debtors who have
fallen on hard times the opportunity for a fresh start in life, after they have
made a good-faith attempt to pay what they can ... [t]he second objective of
the bankruptcy system is to protect creditors in general by preventing an insol
vent debtor from selectively paying off the claims of certain favored creditors
at the expense of others.
Id.

75. § 523(a)(4). See In re Baylis, 313 F.3d 9, 19 (1st Cir. 2002) ("[M]ost of the
exceptions to discharge in bankruptcy are in place for one of two basic reasons[,] ...
policy ... [and] type of debt ....").
76. Baylis, 313 F.3d at 18-19.
77. 3 NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW, supra note 52, at § 47:29 ("The 'badness' re
lated to defalcation by a fiduciary is supplied 'by an individual's special legal status with
respect to another, with its attendant duties and high standards of dealing, and the act
of breaching these duties.") (citation omitted).
78. In re Storie, 216 B.R. 283, 286 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1997); In re Twitchell, 72 B.R.
431,434 (Bankr. D. Utah 1987). See also Radwan, supra note 2, at 1029 (citing to Sheet
Metal Workers Int'I Assoc. v. Carter, 450 U.S. 949, 952 (1981)) ("When that statute is
not entirely clear, however, legislative history may be used to aid in determining the
true interpretation of the statute.").
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plies, the creditor must first prove that the debtor was a fiduciary
and then, establish that defalcation has occurred while the debtor
was acting in that fiduciary capacityJ9 Initially, the courts had diffi
culty in determining when a debtor was acting in a "fiduciary capac
ity"SO because, like the term "defalcation," the Bankruptcy Code
lacks a definition.s1 In 1934, the Supreme Court solved half of this
problem when it determined that unlike the term fiduciary by itself,
which generally means a relationship of trust, acting in a "fiduciary
capacity" requires the formation of a relationship in which a person
entrusts his or her property to the care of another. s2 Since the Su
preme Court decision of Chapman v. Forsyth, "fiduciary capacity"
is to be read strictly to constitute express trusts, meaning "special"
or "technical" trusts, rather "than implied" trusts created by the
debtor's conduct. S3 Therefore "fiduciary capacity" is limited to re
lationships such as those of an attorney-client, managing partner
partner, or corporate office-corporation, where an express trust is
created. s4 Further, the trust relationship must exist prior to any
79. Leah A. Kahl & Peter C. Ismay, Exceptions to Discharge for Fraud or Defal
cation While Acting in a Fiduciary Capacity, 7 J. BANKR. L. & PRACT. 119, 120 (1998).
See also Mahanay, supra note 50, at 284 (citing to In re Bennett, 989 F.2d 779, 784 (5th
Cir. 1993) for the proposition that the court must first find a trust obligation that rises to
the level of a fiduciary relationship and must then determine if a defalcation was
committed).
80. Kahl & Ismay, supra note 79, at 120.
81. Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 U.S. 328, 333 (1934). See also Kahl &
Ismay, supra note 79, at 120 ("The Code does not define 'fiduciary capacity' ....").
82. Davis, 293 U.S. at 332 (interpreting the term "fiduciary capacity" as stated in
§ 17(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Act, now § 523(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code). See also
Summers, supra note 12, at 316 (citing In re Interstate Agency, Inc., 760 F.2d 121, 124
(6th Cir. 1985» (state law determines whether the trust is express and therefore can be
subject to § 523(a)(4) (§ 17(a)(4) at the time this case was decided). See also Bennett,
989 F.2d at 784 (5th Cir. 1993) ("The scope of the concept of fiduciary under
[§ 523(a)(4)] is a question of federal law; however, state law is important in determining
whether or not a trust obligation exists. ").
83. Chapman v. Forsyth, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 202, 208 (1844), cited by Cent. Hanover
Bank & Trust Co. v. Herbst, 93 F.2d 510, 511 (2d Cir. 1937). See also Kahl & Ismay,
supra note 79, at 120 (an express trust is one which is marked by clear language and
intent to create a trust relationship). But see In re Hayes, 183 F.3d 162, 168 (2d Cir.
1999) ("[N]umerous cases have applied the defalcation exception to debts owed by cor
porate officers, notwithstanding the absence of any express trust.").
84. Kahl & Ismay, supra note 79, at 122-23 (distinguishing ordinary commercial
relationships or personal/familial relationships that do not constitute a fiduciary capac
ity under § 523(a)(4». See id. for a discussion of types of fiduciary relationships that
may be affected by § 523(a)(4). See also Janet A. Flaccus, Attorney Malpractice Judg
ments, Bankruptcy Discharge and Professional Responsibility, 4 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC.
219, 223 (1995). Many cases involving a contractor who is required to pay his material
man have found that the contractor is acting in a fiduciary capacity because the statutes
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wrongdoing. 85
Under the present construction of § 523(a)(4), the term "fidu
ciary" is read narrowly, to include only express trusts. This, cou
pled with a broad reading of "defalcation," is not easily "reconciled
with the concept of a fresh start for the 'honest but unfortunate'
debtor"86 because it presents a lower threshold of proof for a credi
tor than any of the other exceptions for discharge. 87 With such a
construction, once evidence of the existence of an express trust is
shown the creditor needs to prove only that the debtor had an obli
gation to the trust which was not met in order to find the debtor
guilty of a defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity.88
Similarly, Congress has given no evidence of its intentions in
using the word defalcation in the context of exceptions to discharge
and, as a result, courts have been in disagreement as to how the
word should be interpreted. 89 Some definitions of defalcation ac
cepted by the courts include: "the failure to meet an obligation" or
a "nonfraudulent default,"90 embezzlement,91 "misappropriation of
regarding this relationship determined which beneficiaries were to be paid first. Id. (cit
ing Carlisle Cashway Inc. v. Johnson, 691 F.2d 249, 251-54 (6th Cir. 1982».
85. Bennett, 989 F.2d at 784 (citing Upshur v. Brisco, 138 U.S. 365, 378 (1890».
See also Davis, 293 U.S. at 333 (adding the criteria that these special trust must be
created prior to the alleged fraud or defalcation and stating the trust must exist prior to
the circumstances leading to bankruptcy).
86. 3 NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW, supra note 52, at § 47:29. The narrow reach of
fiduciary could therefore preclude some deviant acts that simply did not fall under the
express trust category while honest debtors making innocent mistakes could be held to
have committed defalcation if they are entrusted to an express trust when making the
unfortunate mistake. Id.
87. Kahl & Ismay, supra note 79, at 136.
88. Id. A fiduciary can be charged with defalcation if there is a decrease in funds
and can also be charged with defalcation for inappropriately using funds, since a fiduci
ary is charged with knowledge of the law and his obligations to the trust. Id.
89. In re Baylis, 313 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 2002). See also Flaccus, supra note 84, at
229-30; In re Janikowski, 60 B.R. 784, 789-90 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (suggesting that defalca
tion may be applied to property, perhaps even a cause of action, as well as funds). Thus
another question, which will not be answered by this Note, is to which type(s) of prop
erty should defalcation be applied?
90. See In re Uwimana, 274 F.3d 806, 811 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 427 (7th ed. 1999» (defining "defalcation"). But see A DICTIONARY OF
MODERN AMERICAN USAGE (B. Garner ed. 1998), cited by Baylis, 313 F.3d at 18 n.4
("[S]ome writers have misused defalcation when referring to a non-fraudulent
default. ").
91. See Baylis, 313 F.3d at 17 (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 427 (7th ed.
1999» (defining "defalcation"). This edition of Black's also uses defalcation as a syno
nym for embezzlement (meaning, according to this edition of Black's, "[t]he fraudulent
taking of personal property with which one has been entrusted, esp[ecially] as a
fiduciary").
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trust funds or money held in a fiduciary capacity; [the] failure to
properly account for such funds,"92 or "the embezzlement, misap
propriation of trust funds held in a fiduciary capacity, and failure to
properly account for trust funds."93 When the term defalcation is
used outside of the § 523(a)(4) exception, it is usually to show that
fiduciaries breached their duty; most often in association with ac
counting for funds entrusted to them. 94
In 1937, the Second Circuit stated in Central Hanover that
"'defalcation,' ordinarily implies some moral dereliction . . . ."95
This was the first case to map out thoroughly the history of the term
in bankruptcy legislation96 and was the first to question (but leave
unanswered) whether an act of defalcation requires specific in
tent. 97 In tracing the history of the term, Judge Learned Hand
noted that "defalcation" was first used in the Bankruptcy Act of
1841, not as an exception to discharge, but as part of a definition for
those who would be eligible for voluntary bankruptcy.98 In 1867,
the term was used as one of the original exceptions to discharge,
that of "defalcation as a public officer, or while acting in any fiduci
ary character."99 Searching for the original meaning of the term,
92. In re Cochrane, 124 F.3d 978, 984 (8th Cir. 1997).
93. In re Friedman, 298 B.R. 487,503 (Bankr. D.Mass. 2003).
94. See, e.g., Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 13 (1991) (where a
licensed insurance agent committed defalcations in misappropriating payments for life
insurance premiums when the policies had expired); U.S. v. Porter, 90 F.3d 64, 70 (2d
Cir. 1996) (where an employee of financial brokerage firms committed defalcations in
misdirecting customers' funds to her own banking account).
95. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Herbst, 93 F.2d 510, 511 (2d Cir. 1937).
96. In re Storie, 216 B.R. 283, 288 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997).
97. Hanover, 93 F.2d at 511 ('''[D]efalcation,' ordinarily implies some moral der
eliction, but in this context it may have included innocent defaults, so as to include all
fiduciaries who for any reason were short in their accounts.") (emphasis added). Also
note the use of "in this context" seems to suggest that the use of defalcation as part of a
definition, its original use in the Bankruptcy Code, rather than as an exception, "may
have included innocent defaults."
98. Id. Defalcation first appears in 5 Stat. 440 § 1:
All persons whatsoever, residing in any state, district or territory of the United
States, owing debts, which shall not have been created in consequence of de
falcation as a public officer, or as executor, administrator, guardian or trustee,
or while acting in any other fiduciary capacity, who shall by petition ... apply
to this proper court ... shall be deemed bankrupts within the purview of this
act.
An Act to Establish a Uniform System of Bankruptcy Throughout the United States,
ch. 9, 4 Stat. 440, 441 (1841) (repealed 1843».
99. Hanover, 93 F.2d at 511 (citing section 33 of the Act of 1867). See also supra
note 43 and accompanying text (stating the 1867 law was repealed because it laid down
so many exceptions for discharge that only one-third of debtors actually received
discharge) .
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the court posited that "defalcation" must not mean "fraud or em
bezzlement," since the terms were juxtaposed in the Act of 1867,
and therefore defalcation "must here have covered defaults other
than deliberate malversions ...."100 Since Central Hanover, the cir
cuit courts have disagreed on whether a debtor must have intent to
constitute defalcation.101
E.

The Circuit Split

Although Central Hanover began the discussion and proposed
some possible considerations as to the meaning of defalcation, the
court held only that "when a fiduciary takes money upon a condi
tional authority which may be revoked and knows at the time that it
may, he is guilty of a 'defalcation' though it may not be a 'fraud,' or
an 'embezzlement,' or perhaps not even a 'misappropriation.' "102
The court did not conclude whether any level of mens rea was re
quired to constitute defalcation. However, Judge Learned Hand's
opinion provoked controversy by stating: "defalcation ... may have
included innocent defaults ... ."103 Relying on this dictum as pre
cedent, some circuits have ruled that even innocent mistakes made
by a fiduciary could cause a particular debt to be excepted from
discharge. 104 Others have held that a standard of negligence is re
quired for a defalcation exception. 105 Still other circuits have held
that a "willful neglect of duty" or "recklessness" standard must be
100. Hanover, 93 F.2d at 511; The History of the Bankruptcy Laws, supra note 25,
at 19-20. See An Act to Establish a Uniform System of Bankruptcy Throughout the
United States, ch. 176,14 Stat. 517,533 (1867) (codified in Title LXI Rev. Stat. § 5117
(1878) (repealed 1878» ("No debt created by the fraud or embezzlement of the bank
rupt, or by his defalcation as a public officer, or while acting in any fiduciary character,
shall be discharged under this act.").
101. In re Baylis, 313 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 2002) (recognizing that Hanover's sug
gestion that a defalcation may exist where a fiduciary commits an innocent mistake has
caused differing camps of interpretations to spring up among the courts).
102. Hanover, 93 F.2d at 512.
103. Id. at 511.
104. In re Uwimana, 274 F.3d 806, 811 (4th Cir. 2001) ("[N]egligence or even an
innocent mistake which results in misappropriation or failure to account is sufficient
[for defalcation]."); In re Cochrane, 124 F.3d 978, 984 (8th Cir. 1997) ("[D]efalcation
'includes the innocent default of a fiduciary who fails to account fully for money re
ceived.' ") (citing In re Lewis, 97 F.3d 1182, 1186 (9th Cir. 1996»; Lewis, 97 F.3d at 1186
(" '[D]efalcation' includes innocent, as well as intentional or negligent defaults so as to
reach the conduct of all fiduciaries who were short in their accounts.") (quoting In re
Baird, 114 B.R. 198, 204 (B. A. P. 9th Cir. 1990».
105. In re Storie, 216 B.R. 283, 287 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1997) (reasoning that negli
gence would be appropriate since "a fiduciary [should] be charged with knowledge of
his ... duties and of the law ... ") (citing In re Johnson, 691 F.2d 249, 257 (6th Cir.
1982». See generally Hoff v. Carroll, 140 B.R. 313 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1992).
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adopted to establish whether defalcation by a fiduciary occurred. 106
II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASES

Throughout the circuits, courts that have addressed the issue of
whether intent is necessary for defalcation have done so against a
background of vastly different factual circumstances. This section
will explore those facts and the resulting decisions of the courts by
beginning with the introductory case of Central Hanover. Next, this
section will discuss In re Johnson which took an objective approach
and held that specific intent is not required. A discussion of those
cases which have held negligence or innocent mistake is required
will follow. This section will conclude with a discussion of cases
that determined some type of intent is required on behalf of the
debtor to deny discharge for defalcation.
A.

Initiating the Discussion in Central Hanover

As mentioned above, Central Hanover was the case that first
asked what standard must be met for a debtor acting in a fiduciary
capacity to be denied discharge under then 35 U.S.c. § 17(a)(4) of
the Bankruptcy Act, today's 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4).107 In a foreclo
sure proceeding, the New York Supreme Court appointed a dentist,
Herbst, as receiver of the land subject to foreclosure and, as a re
ceiver, acted in a fiduciary capacity.108 Upon sale of the land,
Herbst applied to the court and received fees for his work as re
ceiver, which he either knew or should have known he would be
forced to return if the plaintiff was successful on appea1. 109 Before
the appeal was entered, Herbst spent the money in question. 110 On
appeal, the New York Court of Appeals instructed him to return
the money that he had already spent.
Herbst then filed for bankruptcy seeking discharge of this
debt. ll1 Herbst was adjudicated a voluntary bankrupt. The district
court, however, determined that this particular debt could not be
discharged because his actions constituted "fraud, embezzlement,
misappropriation, or defalcation while acting as an officer or in any
106. Matter of Schwager, 121 F.3d 177, 185 (5th Cir. 1997); In re Meyer, 36 F.3d
1375, 1384 (7th Cir. 1994).
107. Hanover, 93 F.2d at 511.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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fiduciary capacity."112 The Second Circuit took up the case, and
having determined that Herbst was acting in a fiduciary capacity
when he spent the money entrusted to his care, dealt only with
whether the act was defalcation.1 13 The court reasoned that
Herbst's debt was non-dischargeable because it was taken upon
conditional authority, which Herbst, as a fiduciary, should have
known at the time would prohibit him from spending the money.114
Under these factual circumstances, the Second Circuit determined
that the debtor, who "had not been entirely innocent," would not
be allowed to discharge the debt because his actions constituted de
falcation.1 15 The court asked, but did not answer, if there were
other instances in which an innocent mistake on the part of a fiduci
ary could satisfy the exception for defalcation.1 16
Since this question was initially posed in Central Hanover,
courts have struggled to determine whether an innocent mistake is
all that is required to satisfy "defalcation while acting in a fiduciary
capacity."117 Some courts have answered this question affirma
tively. Others have not.
B.

View of the Defalcation Exception as a Type-Based Debt

This section will focus on decisions that have interpreted
§ 523(a)(4) as a type-based debt exception.1 18 It will begin with a
look at the In re lohnson 119 decision, which determined an objec
tive approach requiring no intent is appropriate. It will then discuss
cases determining that negligence or an innocent mistake will con
stitute a defalcation.
112. In re Herbst, 22 F. Supp. 353, 354 (S.D.N.Y. 1937). See also 35 U.S.c.
§ 17(a)(4) (repealed 1979).

113. Hanover, 93 F.2d at 511.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 512 (indicating that some misconduct must be inferred from Herbst's
actions, since he should have known that the funds were subject to return, but also
noted that a deficiency in funds alone might be defalcation). See Flaccus, supra note 84,
at 231. See also In re Hayes, 183 F.3d 162, 172 (2d Cir. 1999) (assuming, as did the court
in Hanover, that "defalcation demands 'some portion of misconduct'" and holding that
the attorney/executor of Andy Warhol's estate committed a defalcation in basing his
fees for legal services on an invalid retainer agreement).
116. Hanover, 93 F.2d at 512.
117. In re Baylis, 313 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 2002).
118. See Radwan, supra note 2, at 993-94 (such exceptions to the fresh start policy
and discharge will only be created "in situations where fairness to the parties warrants a
deviation from [these] accepted bankruptcy policies").
119. In re Johnson, 691 F.2d 249 (6th Cir. 1982), questioned by In re Little, 163
B.R. 497 (Bkrtcy. E.D. Mich. 1994).
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No Intent Required

The Sixth Circuit case of In re lohnson 12o followed the lead of
previous decisions 121 to determine that an objective standard
should be used to establish whether a contractor had committed a
defalcation subject to § 523(a)(4) by failing to pay his material sup
pliers in violation of a Michigan statute. 122 The Central Hanover
court's statement that "defalcations were not limited to deliberate
malversions" was interpreted by the In re Johnson court to mean
that no intent is required for a fiduciary to commit a defalcation
and be denied discharge of the debtP3 This conclusion was backed
by the policy consideration that the bankrupt is charged with
knowledge of the law. 124 Charging such knowledge of the law, the
court's reasoning is in line with the fresh start policy since it does
not weigh the intent or motive of the debtor. 125 Unlike other ex
ceptions of the Bankruptcy Code, where the language clearly re
120. Id. See In re Storie, 216 B.R. 283, 288 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1997) (using similar
analysis with similar factual circumstances to conclude that "'[d]efalcation' ... is ...
failure to account for funds ... whether intentional, willful, reckless, or negligent");
Little, 163 B.R. at 499 (agreeing with In· re Johnson that intent is not required for defal
cation, but arguing that, to the extent that In re Johnson ruled that federal law alone
brought a cause of action for defalcation, it is overruled, since state law determines the
nature of the trust).
121. See Carey Lumber Co. v. Bell, 615 F.2d 370, 376 (5th Cir. 1980); Matter of
Kawczynski, 442 F. Supp. 413, 418 (W.D.N.Y. 1977); Matter of Polidoro, 12 B.R. 867,
870 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
122. Johnson, 691 F.2d at 252. The Michigan Building Contract Fund Act created
a trust by statute between a contractor and subcontractors (trustee) and also imposed a
duty on the contractor to pay the subcontractors prior to making any other purchases or
payments with such funds. Id. The Act also provided that a contractor would be guilty
of a felony if he intentionally used such funds for any other purpose. Id. See also Turner
v. Ward, 154 U.S. 618 (1876); Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509, 512-13 (1960)
(articulating that state law determines the nature of the trust).
123. Johnson, 691 F.2d at 254-55. While the language in the case suggests that a
mistake would constitute defalcation, because no intent is required, the court makes the
clarifying statement that "[w]e hold that the objective fact that monies paid into the
building contract fund were used for purposes other than to pay laborers ... first is
sufficient to constitute a defalcation under section 17(a)(4) so long as the use was not
the result of mere negligence or a mistake of fact ...." Id. at 257. See also Flaccus,
supra note 84, at 231-32 (suggesting that this language may indicate that "the act must
be intentional but the motive is irrelevant").
124. Johnson, 691 F.2d at 257 (arguing that the objective standard would prevent
fiduciaries from using ignorance of the law as an excuse). See also id. at 255-56 ("An
objective standard for finding a defalcation, that does charge a bankrupt with knowl
edge of the law and that does not weigh intent or motive, is consistent with the policy
behind the bankruptcy laws of giving an honest debtor the opportunity for economic
rehabilitation.") (citing Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234,234 (1934».
125. Johnson, 691 F.2d at 255-56.
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quires unscrupulous conduct,126 such "badness" or dishonesty (or
fault) is inferred in 11 U.S.c. § 523(a)(4) from the debtor's failure
to conform with the requirements of the fiduciary's special legal sta
tuS. 127 The court expressed that dispensing with the need for intent
in this case would further ensure that the fiduciary would take extra
precaution in caring for funds that belong to another and in avoid
ing the possibility of breaching such duties,128
However, as noted by the dissent in In re Johnson, this case
involved the question of whether the debtor violated the Michigan
Building Contract Fund Act, specifically requiring proof of intent to
defraud. 129 Therefore, although the court in In re Johnson declared
a standard that "does not weigh intent or motive," a finding of in
tent was required in the state's statute,130 The dissent also stated
that "no interpretation of state law" could eliminate federal law's
fresh start opportunity and that without proof of intent of fraud or
defalcation, the debtor should be discharged of his debt. 131
2.

Negligence or Innocent Mistake is Sufficient

In a case involving an ambassador, by definition a fiduciary of
the country represented, the Fourth Circuit decided that the ambas
sador's actions need not "rise to the level of embezzlement or even
misappropriation" to make the debt non-dischargeable. 132 Since
the responsibilities of an ambassador are so crucial to the embassy
he serves, it mattered only that the ambassador had used embassy
funds to further his own interests; his intent at the time he did so
was of no consequence,133 Using the dictionary definition that de
126. 11 U.S.c. § 523(a)(2)(A) (2002) (exception for "actual fraud"); 11 U.S.c.
§ 523(a)(6) (2004) (exception for "willful and malicious injury" to another).

127. Johnson, 691 F.2d at 256.
128. Id. at 255-56. When entrusted funds are used for other than intended pur
poses, defalcation is sufficiently met "so long as the use was not the result of mere
negligence or a mistake of fact ...." Id. at 257.
129. Id. at 260 (Edwards, C.]., dissenting). See also supra note 122 and accompa
nying text (the Michigan Statute itself provided that a contractor would be guilty of a
felony if he intentionally used such funds for any other purpose).
130. Johnson, 691 F.2d at 260 (Edwards, C.]., dissenting). See also supra note 128
and accompanying text.
131. Johnson, 691 F.2d at 261 (Edwards C.]., dissenting).
132. In re Uwimana, 274 F.3d 806, 811 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing Pahlavi v. Ansari,
113 F.3d 17, 20 (4th Cir. 1997».
133. Uwimana, 274 F.3d at 811-12 (the agent, Uwimana, committed a defalcation
by failing to disclose his acts to, or seek consent from, the principal, the government of
the state he represented).
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falcation is the "failure to meet an obligation,"134 the court rejected
the ambassador's argument that the transfer of money was "within
the scope of his discretion as ambassador."135 Instead, it found that
because the ambassador used funds that belonged to the country he
represented without disclosing the act, he had committed defalca
tion and therefore his debt should remain outstanding. 136 For the
Fourth Circuit, "negligence or even an innocent mistake which re
sults in misappropriation or failure to account is sufficient"137 to
prove defalcation.
The Eighth and Ninth Circuits have also reasoned that a fiduci
ary need not have a specific intent to commit defalcation. 138 In In
re Cochrane, an attorney representing his partnership failed to dis
close pertinent information in order to continue to participate per
sonally in the deal without the partnership's knowledge. 139 The
court held that when an express trust exists in an attorney-client
relationship, no evidence of an intentional wrongdoing is required
for defalcation.140
The Ninth Circuit has changed its view of whether defalcation
requires some sort of intent on the part of the debtor. In 1993, the
In re Martin opinion noted that defalcation has a broad range of
meanings and may entail "moral dereliction . . . imply[ing] some
bad faith or misconduct" or may include innocent defaults as noted
by Central Hanover,141 The court stated that "[a]n exception to dis
charge impairs the debtor's fresh start and should not be read more
broadly than necessary to effectuate policy...."142 Using this ap
proach, the court held that defalcation must require some bad faith
intent. 143 The In re Martin court also found it inconsistent to re
quire intent for "fraud," "embezzlement," and "larceny" III
§ 523(a)(4), but not for a finding of "defalcation."144
134. Id. at 811 (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 427 (7th ed. 1999» (defining
"defalcation").
135. Uwimana, 274 F.3d at 811.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. In re Cochrane, 124 F.3d 978, 984 (8th Cir. 1997); In re Lewis, 97 F.3d 1182,
1186 (9th Cir. 1996).
139. Cochrane, 124 F.3d at 984.
140. Id. Interestingly, the Eighth Circuit states that fraud, embezzlement and lar
ceny, also included in § 523(a)(4), are "solely intentional wrongs" while defalcation "in
clude[s] innocent or negligent misdeeds." !d.
141. In re Martin, 161 B.R. 672, 677 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1993).
142. Id. at 678.
143. Id.
144. See id. (noting that cases such as In re Short, 818 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1987),

2005]

THE DEFALCATION EXCEPTION, TO DISCHARGE

113

Three years later, In re Lewis overruled this decision. 145 In de
termining that Arizona state law defined a partnership as "embod
[ying] an express ... trust," the Ninth Circuit found that members
of a partnership committed defalcation in commingling their part
nership funds with their own independent venture. 146 Overruling
In re Martin,147 the court held that "an individual may be liable for
defalcation without having the intent to defraud."148
Though the fiduciary relationships in the above cases varied,
each circuit ruled that defalcation occurs if there is an express trust
creating a fiduciary relationship within the meaning of
§ 523(a)(4)149 and if the fiduciary breached that duty in failing to
account for funds. 15o In coming to this conclusion, the Fourth,
Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits did not have to determine if the
fiduciaries in question did, in fact, have intent to breach their du
ties. 151 The only inquiry needed was whether the fiduciaries im
properly used funds entrusted to them. 152
C.

View of the Defalcation Exception as a Fault-Based Debt

Reasoning that exceptions to discharge should be narrowly
construed to provide the debtor with a fresh start, other circuits
present an opposing view and require some type of intent on the
part of the debtor to constitute "defalcation" under § 523(a)(4).153
which hold that defalcation includes failure to account for funds, "contain facts which
indicate some degree of culpability greater than mere negligence"). Cf id. at 679-80
(Perris, B.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that the requisite culpa
bility need only be found in failure to conform to the fiduciary's special legal status).
145. In re Lewis, 97 F.3d 1182, 1186-87 (9th Cir. 1996).
146. [d. at 1185-86.
147. Martin, 161 B.R. at 678 ("[M]ere failure to use ordinary care in accounting
for an asset does not per se constitute 'defalcation' within the context of § 523(a)(4).").
148. Lewis, 97 F.3d at 1187.
149. In re Cochrane, 124 F.3d 978, 984 (8th Cir. 1997).
150. Lewis, 97 F.3d at 1186.
151. Though in some of the cases the judges outright doubted that the fiduciaries
were innocent in their actions. See Cochrane 124 F.3d at 984; Quaif v. Johnson, 4 F.3d
950, 955 (11th Cir. 1993).
152. Cf In re Johnson, 691 F.2d 249, 257 (6th Cir. 1982) (stating that as long as
the "funds were used for purposes other than to pay laborers ... so long as the use was
not the result of mere negligence or a mistake of fact . . . subjective intent ... is
irrelevant").
153. In re Baylis, 313 F.3d 9, 18-19 (1st Cir. 2002); Matter of Schwager, 121 F.3d
177, 185 (5th Cir. 1997); In re Martin, 161 B.R. 672, 677-78 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1993);
Matter of Moreno, 892 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1990). See also Meyer v. Ridgon, 36 F.3d
1375, 1380-81 (7th Cir. 1994). In defining § 523(a)(11) (exempts discharge for debts
arising from any act of fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity commit
ted with respect to any depository institution or insured credit union), the Meyer court
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These courts reason that the exceptions to discharge should be nar
rowly construed to provide the debtor with a fresh start. 154
Matter of Moreno 155 was the first of the Fifth Circuit cases that
defined defalcation as "a willful neglect of duty."156 As president,
and hence, officer and fiduciary of a large corporation, Moreno
transferred more than $200,000 to himself and other companies in
which he maintained a separate interest without repaying any por
tion, securing promissory notes, or paying interest.1 57 In Matter of
Schwager, the court found that the managing partner of a partner
ship involved in restaurant operation had breached his fiduciary
duty to the partnership by acting "intentionally, maliciously or with
heedless and reckless disregard of· the rights of the limited part
ners."158 The court determined that such an intentional or reckless
action met the elements of defalcation,159 but also noted that these
Fifth Circuit cases concerning such intentional conduct also in
volved a degree of financial impropriety.16o Its interpretation of
Central Hanover led this circuit to conclude that "defalcation re
quires a lesser standard than fraud, and ... does not require actual
intent" and therefore a standard of "recklessness"161 was appropri
looked to the almost identical language of § 523(a)(4) to conclude that § 523(a)(4) must
have been added to "limit the bankruptcy court's ability to nullify regulatory victories
through its independent power to determine dischargeability" in order to prevent bank
ers from using discharge as an escape for their misconduct. Id. The court agreed that
"defalcation," as interpreted by the Fifth and Sixth Circuits must mean more than "neg
ligent breach of a fiduciary duty." Id. at 1384-85.
154. Meyer, 36 F.3d at 1385.
155. Moreno, 892 F.2d at 421.
156. Schwager, 121 F.3d at 184. See also In re Bennett, 989 F.2d 779, 790 (5th Cir.
1993) (determining that a managing partner had committed defalcation "as a result of
the willful neglect of his fiduciary duties as the managing partner of the limited ...
partnership" when he charged limited partners for expenses that were meant to be
charged to the partnership).
157. Moreno, 892 F.2d at 421 (concluding that such activities constituted defalca
tion, the court determined that whether Moreno personally benefited from the funds
was "significant but not necessarily determinative" in its decision).
158. Schwager, 121 F.3d at 182 n.4 (defining "maliciously" as "conduct that is
specifically intended to cause substantial injury or damage; or ... an act that is carried
out with flagrant disregard for the rights of others and with actual awareness," and
"heedless and reckless disregard" as "more than a momentary thoughtlessness, inadver
tence or error of judgment").
159. [d. at 185.
160. [d. Cf Carey Lumber Co. v. Bell, 615 F.2d 370 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding no
intentional conduct is required for § 523(a)(4)).
161. Schwager, 121 F.3d at 185 n.12 (citing U.S. v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 245
(1985), which defined "willful neglect," though not in the context of bankruptcy, as "a
conscious, intentional failure or reckless indifference").
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ately applied to § 523( a)( 4).1 62
The First Circuit most recently joined this discussion in In re
Baylis, which stated that defalcation "requires some degree of fault,
closer to fraud, without the necessity of meeting a strict specific in
tent requirement. "163 Baylis, a case of first impression for this cir
cuit, examined the fiduciary relationship between an attorney,
acting as a co-trustee, and the beneficiaries of the trust. l64 Attor
ney Baylis drafted the trust and was appointed trustee along with
the settlor's daughter, who also served as paid manager of certain
income properties benefiting the truSt. 165 The beneficiaries of the
trust claimed that Baylis had committed defalcation in two ways.
First, they claimed he failed to properly advise to his co-trustee of
her obligations to the trust when she made her decision not to sign
an agreement to sell income properties to buyers who had already
signed purchase and sale agreements. 166 Second, the beneficiaries
claimed that he used trust funds to pay for and settle a lawsuit
brought against him by the prospective buyers of the income
properties, as well as to pay his own legal expenses after being sued
by the trust itself.167
In determining if either of these actions constituted defalca
tion, the First Circuit applied its new interpretation of
§ 523(a)(4),168 The court plainly stated that Baylis, as an attorney
specializing in trusts and estates, had knowledge of the law and the
duties to which he was bound as a fiduciary of the truSt. 169 Though
162.

Schwager, 121

F.3d at 185 (citing 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY

§ 523.1O(1)(b) (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th rev. ed. 1997) and 2 DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET
AL., BANKRUPTCY, § 7-28 at 368 (1992» ("Fraud requires some intent; defalcation re

quires none."). The Schwager court interpreted this to mean that "[w]hile defalcation
may not require actual intent, it does require some level of mental culpability." Id.
163. In re Baylis, 313 F.3d 9, 18-19 (1st Cir. 2002).
164. Id. at 14-16.
165. Id. at 14.
166. Id. at 15. The beneficiaries also claimed that the debts should not be dis
charged as they resulted from Baylis's "willful and malicious injury ... to the property
of another" under 11 U.S.c. § 523(a)(6) (2004). Id. at 16. See also Rutanen v. Ballard,
678 N.E.2d 133, 136-37 (Mass. 1992). In addition, Baylis was aware that his co-trustee
did not desire to sell the properties. Baylis, 313 F.3d at 14. Regardless, Baylis acquired
purchasers for the properties and drew up purchase and sale agreements which Ballard,
the co-trustee, then refused to sign. Id. at 14.
167. Baylis, 313 F.3d at 21. Baylis's own actions, in obtaining the buyers and in
failing to properly advise the co-trustee of her need to sell, brought about the original
lawsuit between the proposed purchasers of the properties and the trust. Id. at 14-15,
22.
168. Id. at 21-22.
169. Id.
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Baylis was obligated to use reasonable care to advise his co-trustee
and prevent her from committing a breach of her own duty to the
trust, the court stated that if Baylis had acted "reasonably" in re
gard to his duties there would be no defalcation.170 Since Baylis
initially went to the probate court to receive instructions to sell
(though he did not disclose his co-trustee's aversion to the sale), the
court held that his actions did not constitute defalcation because "it
was not unreasonable for Baylis to think the matter would be re
solved if the court gave instructions to sell the property."l71
In deciding whether the second matter, Baylis's use of money
from the trust to fund his own legal expenses, constituted defalca
tion, the First Circuit noted that it is not always inappropriate for a
trustee to receive payments from the trust.1 72 However, the pro
bate court's lower decision found that the trust had no obligation to
defend Baylis, because he had brought about the lawsuit by his own
careless actions and inactions. 173 Baylis violated his duty of loyalty
by causing the suit against the trust (over his failure to sell the
properties) and then by using money from the trust to settle that
lawsuit, as well to defend against allegations of his own personal
fraud. 174 This circuit court found that these actions by Baylis satis
fied the "defalcation" exception under the Bankruptcy Code.175
The varying factual circumstances described above and the di
verse holdings of the circuit courts gives an overview of the manner
in which numerous courts have dealt with the issue of intent and
defalcation. The analysis that follows will strive to provide clarity
on the issue for the future use of courts faced with this historical
dilemma.
III.

ANALYSIS

This section will begin with a discussion of the balancing act
170. Id. at 22.
171. Id. at 22-23 (noting that the breach of loyalty of Ballard, the co-trustee, in
refusing to sign purchase and sale agreements giving rise to the lawsuit, was also egre
gious enough to be defalcation). See also id. at 23 (stating that Baylis's judgments
about how to deal with the actions of his co-trustee were "clearly negligent, but not so
reckless as to rise to the level of fault needed to constitute a defalcation").
172. Id. at 21.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 22.
175. Id. "Baylis's actions as to this component of the debt do constitute defalca
tion. He used trust monies to ... settle the lawsuit . . .. His breach of the duty of
loyalty is exacerbated by the fact that Baylis ... brought about the conditions that led to
the lawsuit." Id. at 22.
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between the fresh start policy and the need to repay creditors and
will consider whether the defalcation exception should be placed in
either the type-based or fault-based category of exceptions. It will
then interpret "defalcation" within the context of the § 523(a)(4)
exception, analyze why a requirement of intent is appropriate in
light of bankruptcy law's fresh start policy, and continue with a dis
cussion of intent to do the act as opposed to intending the conse
quences of that act. The analysis will conclude with a suggestion of
which type of intent to apply to the defalcation exception.
A.

Balancing Act
In interpreting § 523(a)(4), courts must reconcile the fresh start

policy with the notion that some particular debts should not be dis
charged. While the Bankruptcy Code originally allowed discharge
for all provable debts,176 Congress has tempered this initial leniency
by extending over time the list of debts that cannot be dis
charged. 177 While the premier purpose of the Bankruptcy Code is
to provide certain debtors with "a new opportunity ... unhampered
by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt,"178 this
fresh start is available only to honest debtors. A delicate balance
exists between the needs of the debtor and the creditor,179 but if
176. Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 U.S. 328, 331 (1934). See also Williams
v. U.S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 236 U.S. 549, 556 (1915) ("[P]rovable debts include
all liabilities of the bankrupt founded on contract, express or implied, which, at the time
of the bankruptcy, were fixed in amount or susceptible of liquidation.").
177. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (2004). See also Susan Elaine Sieger, et aI., Survey:
Fraud As An Impediment To Discharge-Denial of Discharge And Exceptions To Dis
charge Under the Bankruptcy Code, 3 J. BANKR. L & PRAC. 469, 494 (1994) (citing
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 § 17a(2), 30 Stat. 544, 550) ("The 1898 Act excepted from dis
charge only those 'liabilities for obtaining property by false pretenses or false
representations.' ").
178. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (citing Williams, 236 U.S.
at 554-55) (stating that "the purpose of the Bankruptcy Act [is] to convert the assets of
the bankrupt into cash for distribution among creditors, and then to relieve the honest
debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness, and permit him to start afresh free
from the obligations and responsibilities consequent upon business misfortunes"). See
also Summers, supra note 12, at 314 (articulating the two bankruptcy policies as the
fresh start policy and repayment to similarly situated creditors); Hallinan, supra note
52, at 51 (noting that the Supreme Court often decides bankruptcy issues on the basis of
the fresh start policy) (citing Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971) (seeking to give the
debtor a "new opportunity") and Local Loan, 292 U.S. at 244 (stating that the "purpose
of the act ... is a new opportunity in life"»; supra note 74 and accompanying text
(legislative history indicates that the fresh start policy is the first objective of bank
ruptcy law and repayment to creditors is the second).
179. Gross, supra note 50, at 60 ("[B]ankruptcy legislation reflects a longstanding
struggle to reconcile the debtor's ability to retain future earnings with her creditors'
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debtors happen upon honest failure, the Bankruptcy Code must
construe their actions in the broadest sense to provide them with a
fresh start while also properly deterring the debtors from acting
dishonestly.18o

B.

Categorizing § 523(a)(4) as a Type-Based or Fault-Based
Exception

As stated earlier, § 523(a) exceptions to discharge generally
fall into one of two categories: type-based and fault-based.1 81 Con
gress created exceptions in these two categories to balance the need
to maintain debtor liability for certain debts against the policy al
lowing honest debtors to discharge their debts and start afresh. To
find whether intent is necessary to constitute defalcation, it is help
ful to determine in which category § 523(a)(4) belongs.
Type-based exceptions to discharge do not require proof of
debtor's wrongful intent and cannot be discharged, even if incurred
by an honest debtor. 182 Debts that may not be discharged because
of their type include those for a tax or customs duty,183 child s'up
portor alimony,184 a fine or penaity,185 an educational loan or bene
fit,186 death or personal injury caused by a debtor's driving while
intoxicated,187 any payment of an order of restitution,188 a condo
minium ownership fee,189 or court fees. 190 These exceptions do not
legitimate desires to maximize their recoveries ...." ). See also infra note 182 and
accompanying text; Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 287 (1991) ("Requiring the credi
tor to establish" that the debtor committed fraud "by a preponderance of the evi
dence," rather than by clear and convincing evidence, "reflects a fair balance between
these conflicting interests. ").
180. See In re Spar, 176 B.R. 321, 326 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994) (stating that an
equally important policy consideration is to "prevent the dishonest 'debtor's attempts
to use the law's protections to shield his or her wrongdoing"') (quoting Matter of New
ark, 20 B.R. 842, 852 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982».
181. In re Baylis, 313 F.3d 9, 19 (1st Cir. 2002) (articulating that type-based debts
are not discharged because forgiveness of a certain type of debt would not further a
social policy and fault-based debts are not discharged because the debt resulted from
some immoral or dishonest act done by the debtor).
182. Id.
183. 11 U.S.c. §§ 523(a)(1)(A) and (B) (2004).
184. § 523(a)(5). See also § 523(a)(15) (debts incurred in the course of a divorce
or separation will not be discharged).
185. § 523(a)(7).
186. § 523(a)(8).
187. § 523(a)(9). But see Baylis, 313 F.3d at 19 (labeling this exception as a faultbased debt with fault being inferred from voluntary intoxication).
188. § 523(a)(13).
189. § 523(a)(16).
190. § 523(a)(17).
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include, either through implication or expressly, words indicating
that the debtor must possess some level of intent, but instead stand
on their own as a matter of law.
Other § 523(a) exceptions do contain words that look to the
conduct of the debtor. These fault-based exceptions include debts
for property obtained by false pretenses, by actual fraud 191 or by
use of a written statement that is materially false and that the
debtor made with intent to deceive,192 debts involving willful and
malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property
of another entity,193 and malicious or reckless failure of the debtor
to fulfill any commitment to a Federal depository institution's regu
latory agency to maintain the capital of an insured depository
institution. 194
The § 523(a)(4) defalcation exception can be viewed as type
based, holding fiduciaries liable for debts that occur while he or she
acts in his or her special legal role.1 95 While this view is arguable,
even cases that tout the defalcation exception as type-based involve
some wrongdoing on behalf of the fiduciary.196 The exception is
fault-based if it requires dishonesty or wrongdoing on behalf of the
fiduciary. Section 523(a)( 4) is probably more like fault-based ex
ceptions, in that it contains language that suggests dishonesty on the
part of the debtor.1 97 If one has committed fraud while acting in a
fiduciary capacity (interpreted by Neal v. Clark to be actual
fraud)198 then the fiduciary has committed a dishonest act with the
intention to do so. Likewise, if one commits embezzlement 199 or
191. § 523(a)(2)(A).
192. § 523(a)(2)(B).
193. § 523(a)(6).
194. § 523(a )(12).
195. In re Uwimana, 274 F.3d 806, 811 (4th Cir. 2001); In re Cochrane, 124 F.3d
978, 984 (8th Cir. 1997); In re Lewis, 97 F.3d 1182, 1186 (9th Cir. 1996). See also In re
Baylis, 313 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 2002). According to the Baylis court:
It is arguable that defalcation by a fiduciary fits into this 'type of debt' cate
gory-that is, that Congress intended to reinforce the high standard of care
owed by fiduciaries by making debts for defalcation non-dischargeable. That
reading is, we think, an unlikely one, and we see no strong federal interest in
making every debt from breach of a fiduciary duty non-dischargeable.
Id.
196. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
197. See supra note 140 (the Eighth Circuit states that fraud, embezzlement and
larceny, also included in § 523(a)(4), are "solely intentional wrongs" while defalcation
"include[s] innocent misdeeds").
198. Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704, 709 (1877).
199. See supra note 91; In re Belfry, 862 F.2d 661, 662 (8th Cir. 1988) (asserting
that for the purposes of § 523(a)(4), embezzlement "is the fraudulent appropriation of
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larceny,200 then intent is inferred, since the debtor dishonestly ap
propriated entrusted funds. It is inconsistent to arbitrarily place the
word "defalcation," which can be read to include innocent misallo
cations or more deliberate defaults,201 among these fault-based ex
ceptions if it were not to be read as requiring some sort of intent on
behalf of the debtor.202 To determine which view is more appropri
ate, it is necessary to look at the meaning of defalcation.
C.

Deciphering Defalcation

Due to the scarcity of legislative history203 regarding how Con
gress intended the courts to interpret the § 523(a)(4) meaning of
defalcation, we are forced to look elsewhere for an appropriate
meaning. 204 We may look to the wording of the statute, including
use and positioning of words, as well as how they have changed
over the history of the Code;205 the way in which interpretation of
the term coincides with the intended purposes of the Code,z06 and;
the methods the various circuit courts have used in defining the
term.
property of another by a person to whom such property has been entrusted or into
whose hands it has lawfully come"). See also 3 NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW, supra note
52, at § 47:47 ("The elements of embezzlement under Code § 523(a)(4) are: (1) appro·
priation of funds by the debtor; (2) for the debtor's use or benefit; (3) done with fraudu
lent intent. ").
200. See infra note 228 and accompanying text. See also 3 NORTON BANKRUPTCY
LAW, supra note 52, at § 47:47 (stating that the elements of larceny under common law
are: "a finding that the debtor wrongfully, and with fraudulent intent, took the property
of another").
201. In re Martin, 161 B.R. 672, 677 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. (Cal.) 1993) ("The primary
difficulty is that definitions vary on whether defalcation includes some element of cul
pable conduct ....").
202. Id. at 678. See also infra note 238 and accompanying text.
203. Reinhardt & Horlbeck, supra note 8, at 1774.
204. Ardenstani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129, 135 (1991); Rubin v. U.S., 449 U.S. 424, 430
(1981) (explaining when a statute's language is ambiguous, we may look not only to the
language of the statute to determine its intended meaning, but also to the expressed
intent of the legislature).
205. Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704, 708 (1877). In interpreting fraud, the Supreme
Court looked to the "familiar rule in the interpretation of written instruments and stat
utes that 'a passage will be best interpreted by reference to that which precedes and
follows it.' So, also, 'the meaning of a word may be ascertained by reference to the
meaning of words associated with it.'" Id. (citation omitted).
206. K-mart v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988) ("In ascertaining the plain
meaning of the statute, the court must look to the particular statutory language at issue,
as well as the language and design of the statute as a whole."). See also U.S. v. Bois
dore's Heirs, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 113, 122 (1850) ("In expounding a statute, we must not
be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of
the whole law, and to its object and policy.").
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As noted above, "defalcation" has been defined by standard
dictionaries in a variety of ways ranging from "the failure to meet
an obligation" to "misappropriation of trust funds [by a fiduci
ary]."207 In the mid-1800s, which is the time of the word's origin in
bankruptcy law, defalcation meant either "the reduction of a claim
of one of the contracting parties against the other, by deducting
from it a smaller claim due from the former to the latter" or "the
act of a defaulter."208 It is not clear whether Congress wanted a
narrower or broader reading of the word.
In interpreting the Bankruptcy Code, courts have continued to
fill in gaps left, whether intentionally or otherwise, by Congress. In
1878, the Supreme Court made a crucial decision in determining
how "fraud" should be read in the section of the 1867 Bankruptcy
Act that is analogous to today's § 523(a)(4).209 In Neal v. Clark, the
Supreme Court determined that fraud, which could mean "actual
fraud ... implied or constructive fraud, or gross negligence, which
may be equivalent to fraud," meant positive fraud involving "moral
turpitude" or bad faith.210 The Court noted that "[a] different con
struction would be inconsistent with the liberal spirit which per
vades the entire bankrupt[cy] system."211 Similarly, in 1844 the
Supreme Court reasoned that "fiduciary" should be read more nar
rowly within bankruptcy law to include only those fiduciary duties
created by express trustS.212 Therefore, in § 523(a)(4), fiduciary ex
207. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text for definitions of defalcation.
See also In re Uwimana, 274 F.3d 806, 811 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing BLACK'S LAW DIC·
TIONARY 427 (7th ed. 1999» (defining "defalcation"). But see In re Baylis, 313 F.3d 9,
18 n.4 (1st Cir. 2002) (citing A DICTIONARY OF MODERN AMERICAN USAGE 191 (B.
Garner ed., 1998)) ("[S]ome writers have misused defalcation while referring to a non
fraudulent default ....").
208. A LAW DICTIONARY BY JOHN BOUVIER (6th ed. 1856) (citing the Bank
ruptcy Act of 1841), available at http://www.constitution.org/bouvlbouviecd.htm (last
visited Feb. 28, 2005).
209. Neal, 95 U.S. at 707. See also An Act to Establish a Uniform System of
Bankruptcy Throughout the United States, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517, 533 (1867) (codified at
Title CXI Rev. Stat. § 5117 (1878) (repealed 1878)) ("No debt created by the fraud or
embezzlement of the bankrupt, or by his defalcation as a public officer, or while acting
in any fiduciary character, shall be discharged under this act."). Cf 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)
(2004) (noting that the legislative history comments state that "subparagraph (A) of
523(a)(2)(A) is intended to codify current case law, e.g., Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704
(1887), which interprets 'fraud' to mean actual or positive fraud rather than fraud im
plied in law").
210. Neal, 95 U.S. at 707-08.
211. Id. at 709.
212. Chapman v. Forsyth, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 202 (1844) (interpreting "fiduciary"
under the Bankruptcy Act of 1841). See also Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 U.S.
328, 393 (1934) (further limiting "fiduciary" to include only those debts created prior to
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cludes many traditional dictionary definitions of the word. 213 These
Supreme Court interpretations show that a term may not always be
defined by its traditional meaning and may be narrowed to suit the
"liberal spirit" of the Bankruptcy Code.214 While many courts have
read defalcation in its traditional broad sense, there is reason to
question whether this approach is consistent with bankruptcy policy
and if "defalcation" should have a narrower meaning within
§ 523(a)(4).
The word "defalcation" appeared initially in the Bankruptcy
Code in 1841 and has remained to the modern day, although its
positioning in text has changed. 2Is In Neal v. Clark, the Supreme
Court, in interpreting the meaning of fraud within the Bankruptcy
Act, used the maxim that "the coupling of words together shows
that they are to be understood in the same sense."216 It also ac
knowledged that if the meaning of a statute is unclear, the intent of
the drafters may be ascertained by looking at neighboring words. 217
the wrong). But see Baylis, 313 F.3d at 13 (stating that the notion that "fiduciary capac
ity" relates only to express trusts is no longer clear).
213. Kahl & Ismay, supra note 79, at 121 (stating that the traditional meaning of
fiduciary, a confidence or trust, is too broad a definition within the bankruptcy context;
commercial relationships, such as those of agents, bailees, brokers, factors and partners,
are not contemplated by this section of the Code).
214. Neal, 95 U.S. at 709.
215. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Herbst, 93 F.2d 510, 511 (2d Cir. 1937).
See also Flaccus, supra note 84, at 231. The 1841 statute provided that:
[a]1I persons whatsoever, residing in any State, District or Territory of the
United States, owing debts, which shall not have been created in consequence
of a defalcation as a public officer; or as executor, administrator, guardian or
trustee, or while acting in any other fiduciary capacity, who shall, by peti
tion ... apply to the proper court ... shall be deemed bankrupts within the
purview of this act . . ..
An Act to Establish a Uniform System of Bankruptcy Throughout the United States,
ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440, 441 (1841) (repealed 1843).
The 1867 statute said, "no debt created by the fraud or embezzlement of the bank
rupt, or by his defalcation as a public officer, or while acting in any fiduciary character,
shall be discharged under this act ...." An Act to Establish a Uniform System of
Bankruptcy Throughout the United States, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517, 533 (1867) (codified at
Title LXI Rev. Stat. § 5117 (1878) (repealed 1878».
The 1898 act said, "[a] discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of
his provable debts, except such as ... (4) were created by his fraud, embezzlement,
misappropriation, or defalcation while acting as an officer or in any fiduciary capacity."
An Act to Establish a Uniform System of Bankruptcy Throughout the United States,
ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, 550-51 (codified at 11 U.S.c. § 17(a)(4) (1898) (repealed 1979)).
Finally, the current Code says, "[a] discharge ... does not discharge an individual
debtor from any debt ... (4) for fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capac
ity, embezzlement or larceny." 11 U.S.c. § 523(a)(4) (2003).
216. Neal, 95 U.S. at 708-09.
217. Id. at 708 ("It is a familiar rule in the interpretation of written instruments
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At that time, "fraud" was coupled with the term "embezzle
ment."218 The Court reasoned that since "embezzlement" involved
an intentional wrong219 and "fraud" was in direct association with
the term, then Congress must have intended "fraud" to mean actual
or positive fraud in this exception, even though it could have meant
implied fraud.2 20
Applying such reasoning to elucidate the 1898 Act, one could
presume that in choosing the placement of the words "fraud, em
bezzlement, misappropriation, or defalcation," Congress meant
each to encompass some level of intent. 221 The 1898 phraseology
was repealed in 1979 and replaced with the current structure plac
ing "fraud" and "defalcation" in direct association with one another
and modifying both these words with "while acting in a fiduciary
capacity."222 Courts have construed this arrangement to mean that
"while acting in a fiduciary capacity" limits only "fraud" and "defal
cation," while "embezzlement" and the newly added "larceny"
have a much broader scope and include non-fiduciaries. 223 Not
only was the positioning of these terms altered in 1979, but "misap
propriation" was eliminated and "larceny" was added. 224 It is inter
esting to note that "misappropriation," which was interpreted by
and statutes that 'a passage will be best interpreted by reference to that which precedes
and follows it. "') (citation omitted).
218. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
219. See In re Belfry, 862 F.2d 661, 662 (8th Cir. 1988) ) (quoting In re Shultz, 46
B.R. 880, 889 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1985» (restating that for the purposes of § 523(a)(4),
embezzlement "is the fraudulent appropriation of property of another by a person to
whom such property has been entrusted or into whose hands it has lawfully come.").
220. Neal, 95 U.S. at 709 (stating that this reading was justified if not required and
"[s]uch a construction of the statute is consonant with equity, and consistent with the
object and intention of Congress in enacting a general law by which the honest citizen
may be relieved from the burden of hopeless insolvency").
221. See supra note 215 and accompanying text. The 1898 act said, "[a] discharge
in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his provable debts, except such as ...
(4) were created by his fraud, embezzlement, misappropriation, or defalcation while
acting as an officer or in any fiduciary capacity." An Act to Establish a Uniform System
of Bankruptcy Throughout the United States, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, 550-51 (codified at
11 U.S.c. § 17(a)(4) (1898) (repealed 1979».
222. See supra note 215 and accompanying text. See also 11 U.S.c. § 523(a)
(2000) (noting the legislative statements in S. REP. No. 95-989, at 79 (1978) discussed
that § 523(a)(4) "excepts debts for fraud incurred by the debtor while acting in a fiduci
ary capacity or for defalcation, embezzlement, or misappropriation").
223. See In re Graziano, 35 B.R. 589, 594 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983) questioned by
In re Goux, 72 B.R. 355 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1987); In re Carlton, 26 B.R. 202, 205
(Bankr. Tenn. 1982).
224. See supra note 215. See also Graziano, 35 B.R. at 593 (stating that the addi
tion of the word larceny along with rearrangement of the phrase "while acting in a
fiduciary capacity" constitute "significant revision[ s1").
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the Fifth Circuit to require no intent,225 was dropped and replaced
by "larceny," defined as "the fraudulent and wrongful taking and
carrying away the property of another with intent to convert such
property to the taker's use without the consent of the owner."226
The modification of "fraud" and "defalcation" with "while act
ing in a fiduciary capacity" can be interpreted in a variety of ways.
"Fraud" may require intent while "defalcation" requires none (this
conclusion can be drawn from the argument that, Congress would
not have added both words where one would be sufficient227 );
"fraud" and "defalcation" may take on the same level of intent, or;
"fraud" and "defalcation" may each require some intent but the
level of intent may be different for each. Taking cues from the Su
preme Court in Neal v. Clark as to how the Bankruptcy Code
should be interpreted,228 "fraud" and "defalcation" are like terms
that should be read together and thus, both should require intent.229
Since Neal v. Clark held that both "fraud" and "embezzlement" in
the 1898 Act required an intentional wrong on the part of the
debtor, it follows that "defalcation," which is in direct association
with "fraud" in the Bankruptcy Code, would also require an inten
tional wrong.230 Such an interpretation is in accordance with the
225. Carey Lumber Co. v. Bell, 615 F.2d 370, 376 (5th Cir. 1980). But see In re
Brown, 4 B.R. 539, 544 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1980) ("To find a 'misappropriation' as that
term is used in § 17a(4) of the Bankruptcy Act, there must be a taking, the taking must
be intentional, and it must be improper or unlawful.").
226. Graziano, 35 B.R. at 594 (also noting that larceny and embezzlement differ
only in the manner with which the debtor takes possession of the funds).
227. Hibbs v. Winn, 124 S. Ct. 2276, 2286 (2004) ("A statute should be construed
so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superflu
ous, void or insignificant ....") (citation omitted).
228. 11 U.S.c. § 523(a) (2000) (quoting N. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 46.06, (rev. 6th ed. 2000» (stating subparagraph (A) [of
§ 523(a)(2)(A)] is intended to codify current case law, e.g. Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704
(1887) [24 L.Ed. 586], which interprets 'fraud' to mean actual or positive fraud rather
than fraud implied in law).
229. Neal, 95 U.S. at 709. See also FJaccus, supra note 84, at 229-30. Flaccus
states that
if fraud means moral turpitude or intentional wrongdoing, this could influence
the interpretation of the word 'defalcation' with which 'fraud' is coupled in the
statutory language. The argument could be made that defalcation, too, should
mean some type of wrongdoing, that putting intentional lies along with inno
cent defalcations without covering some type of intermediary misconduct
seems odd.
Id. See also Singer, supra note 60, at 368 ("The fraud [in the context of §523(a)(4)1must
involve a moral turpitude or intentional wrong; fraud implied in law, or constructive
fraud, which may exist without the imputation of immorality or bad faith, is
insufficient.").
230. Neal, 95 U.S. at 709.
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fresh start policy.
The Ninth Circuit in In re Martin 231 raised a similar argument.
That court stated that it would be inconsistent to read defalcation as
not requiring any intent, when every other act in § 523(a)(4) re
quires "some element of bad faith."232 Following Neal v. Clark's
logic that like words are grouped together, this court said that "de
falcation" must involve bad faith of a sort, since it is included in the
same section as "fraud," "embezzlement," and "larceny."233 Since
it would be redundant to include terms with the same level of in
tent,234 the Court resolved that defalcation requires intent but at a
lesser level than fraud.
D.

Requiring Intent: In Accordance With Fresh Start Policy

A requirement of intent gives § 523(a)(4) a narrow construc
tion, which is consistent with the Bankruptcy Code's fresh start pol
icy.235 In deference to this policy, the Supreme Court provided
lower courts with a general rule of liberal construction favoring the
debtor and has suggested that limits to discharge under § 523
"should be construed narrowly so as to assure that the basic policy
of giving the honest debtor a fresh start is not frustrated. "236 The
Court also stated that exceptions "should not be read more broadly
231. In re Martin, 161 B.R. 672, 678 (B.A.P 9th Cir. 1993), overruled by In re
Lewis, 97 F.3d 1182, 1187 (9th Cir. 1996).
232. Martin, 161 B.R. at 678. See also supra note 140 (stating that fraud, embez
zlement and larceny, also included in § 523(a)(4), are "solely intentional wrongs," while
defalcation "include[s] innocent ... misdeeds").
233. Neal, 95 U.S. at 709. See also infra section III.B (categorizing § 523(a)(4) as
a Type-Based or Fault-Based Exception). This is also consistent with the notion that
entire exceptions, rather than parts of them, may be divided into categories of type
based and fault-based debt. Reading defalcation to require no intent would fit it into
the type-based category while fraud, embezzlement and larceny would all fit into the
fault-based category. Such a reading would make the § 523(a)(4) exception vastly dif
ferent from all other § 523(a) exceptions.
234. Hibbs v. Winn, 124 S.Ct. 2276, 2286 (2004).
235. See supra infra section I.B (A Fresh Start for Honest Debtors). See also Hal
linan, supra note 52, at 51 (arguing that the fresh start policy is not only an objective but
perhaps the sole principle of bankruptcy law). See also supra note 74, at 50-51 (the fresh
start policy is the first objective of bankruptcy law).
236. Martin, 161 B.R. at 678 (citing Gleason v. Thaw, 236 U.S. 558, 562 (1915)).
See also Neal, 95 U.S. at 709 (determining that its decision to construe "fraud" as re
quiring moral turpitude was "consonant with equity, and consistent with the object and
intention of Congress in enacting a general law by which the honest citizen may be
relieved from the burden of hopeless insolvency," and further that "[a] different con
struction would be inconsistent with the liberal spirit which pervades the entire bank
rupt system").
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than necessary to effectuate policy."237 To remain consistent with
such precedent, it is reasonable to conclude that defalcation should
require some level of intent on the part of a fiduciary debtor.
A fresh start benefits the debtor, by providing freedom from
debt and collection efforts, and the public, by allowing the debtor to
become a productive member of society once again. 238 It also fur
thers the original goal of bankruptcy law, that of promoting coril
merce. 239 Embarking on a business endeavor or taking on the
responsibility of a fiduciary is risky. Providing discharge as a relief
reduces this risk, thereby giving individuals an incentive, or at least
a safeguard, for their commercial efforts and also providing a fresh
start for those who wish to make a second attempt after unintended
failure. 24o Since it "is impossible to identify in advance 'which indi
viduals will conceive the best ideas'" that will ultimately benefit so
ciety, the relief provided by bankruptcy must be afforded to all
individuals. 241 There remains the possibility that an "honest but un
fortunate" professional or entrepreneur could commit a defalcation
while acting in a fiduciary capacity by making an innocent de
fault.2 42 Therefore, requiring some level of intent for defalcation is
a proper construction that would not frustrate bankruptcy's primary
objective, to promote the fresh start pOlicy.243
237. Martin, 161 B.R. at 678.
238. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1933) (noting the "purpose of the
act [to provide a fresh start] has been again and again emphasized by the courts as being
of public as well as private interest").
239. Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, supra note 26, at 327 (stating that
originally bankruptcy protected creditors, "protecting creditors protected commerce,
and commerce was king").
240. Local Loan, 292 U.S. at 244; Hallinan, supra note 52, at 63 (stating the "pro
ductivity rationale itself was rooted in the established conception of financial failure as
an unavoidable consequence of entrepreneurial risk taking").
241. See John M. Czarnetzy, The Individual and Failure: A Theory of The Bank
ruptcy Discharge, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 393, 405 (2000) (for a complete discussion of the
entrepreneurial theory behind discharge).
242. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Herbst, 93 F.2d 510, 511 (2d Cir. 1937)
(suggesting that an innocent default may constitute defalcation). See also Czarnetzky,
supra note 241, at 412 (suggesting that the entrepreneur who undertakes a business risk
that results in failure is such an "'honest, but unfortunate' debtor[ ]").
243. See supra note 235 and accompanying text; see also notes 64 and 74 and
accompanying legislative history discussing the importance of the fresh start policy. See
also Hallinan, supra note 52, at 54 (asserting that the fresh start "was originally con
ceived not as a relief measure but as a reward for the debtor's efforts to maximize the
return to his creditors"; therefore, this liberal construction favoring the debtor and dis
charge may also provide the debtor with incentive to initiate bankruptcy proceedings
that in tum, promotes the second policy of bankruptcy law-repayment to creditors).
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Intent To Do The Act

Reading the § 523(a)(4) defalcation exception as requiring in
tent on the part of the debtor is consistent with the policies of the
Bankruptcy Code and with statutory interpretation used by the Su
preme Court in interpreting the Bankruptcy Code. However, it is
not clear whether this means that the debtor must simply intend to
commit the act, which itself triggers defalcation, or whether he or
she must intend to produce the outcome that results from the act. 244
Section 523(a)(6) of Title 11, an exception for willful (meaning
deliberate and more than merely reckless)245 and malicious246 in
jury to an entity or its property, articulates an exemption to dis
charge for those who willfully cause injury. It would be redundant
for defalcation to require a similar mental state. 247 In Kawaauhau
v. Geiger, the Supreme Court determined that the § 523(a)(6) ex
ception for "willful and malicious injury" requires the debtor to "in
tend the [actual] consequences of an act, not simply the act
itself."248 Therefore, § 523(a)(6) does not cover instances in which
the act is intended, but the resulting injury is not the desired out
come of the debtor,249 nor does it encompass debts arising from
recklessly or negligently inflicted injuries. 250 As a result of the Su
preme Court decision in Kawaauhau v. Geiger, a creditor would
have to show that the debtor intended to cause the injury, not only
to do the act causing the injury, in order to deny discharge of a debt
244. In re Baylis, 313 F.3d 9, 19 (1st Cir. 2002) ("Specific intent requires that the
accused have the intent to accomplish the precise criminal act with which he is
charged.").
245. Singer, supra note 60, at 376-77.
246. Id. at 377 (stating the element of maliciousness "requires a heightened level
of culpability which transcends mere willfulness" but does not require spite or ill will).
247. Baylis, 313 F.3d at 17. See BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL § 4:36 (5th ed. 2003)
("In order to avoid redundancy within Section 523(a), defalcation must mean some
thing ... different from willful and malicious injury because that is covered by Section
523(a)(6)."). See also In re Martin, 161 B.R. 672, 680 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating that inten
tional tortious conduct would be unnecessary for § 523(a)(4) "in light of the broad defi
nition of willful and malicious conduct applied under [§ 523(a)(6)]").
248. Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 57-58 (1998) (finding that "a debt arising
from a medical malpractice judgment attributable to negligent or reckless conduct"
does not fall within the § 523(a)(6) exception).
249. Id. at 62 (noting that a broader reading of the exception "would be incom
patible with the 'well known' guide that exceptions to discharge 'should be confined to
those plainly expressed' ").
250. Id. at 64; 6 NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISER 12, The New "Intentional Tort"
Standard Under Section 523(a)(6) (1998). This holding adjusted one of the common
uses of § 523(a)(6) by creditors who argued that discharge should not be granted to the
debtor who converted the creditor's property without its consent.
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under § 523(a)(6).251
In In re Johnson, which used an objective standard to decide if
a debtor has committed defalcation,252 the Sixth Circuit stated that
"mere negligence or a mistake of fact" was not sufficient to consti
tute a defalcation, but also refused to require a specific motive or
wrongful intent. 253 One can resolve the seemingly contradictory
parts of the opinion by interpreting it as saying that a debtor does
not need to intend the consequences of his or her actions, but that
the act that brings about the consequences was intentional and did
not occur by mistake. Since willful and malicious intent to injure
property is covered by section § 523(a)(6), it is fitting to read
§ 523(a)(4) as requiring intent on the part of the debtor to do the
act, but not necessarily to intend the consequences of that act. 254
Let us revisit the introduction's hypotheticaF55 while using the
standard that the defalcation exception requires an intent to do the
act, but not intent to cause the deleterious outcome. The trustee
described in the above hypothetical situation who placed funds in a
bank that misrepresents itself as federally insured did not intend to
place the funds in a non-federally insured bank, nor did he intend
that the bank go belly-up. Therefore, this fiduciary made a mistake,
but did not commit a defalcation. The trustee who placed funds in
a non-insured bank that did not advertise itself as insured is a bit
trickier. The court would need to determine whether the trustee
intended to place the funds in a bank that was not insured; if he did,
even though he did not intend the bank to go bankrupt, he could
still be liable for defalcation. However, if he was merely negligent
in placing the funds in a non-insured bank, it would be consistent
with the Bankruptcy Code to allow him a discharge of the debt and
a fresh start. In opposite, the trustee who intended to invest trust
funds in his own company as a temporary loan, against the owner's
instructions to secure the funds in a federally insured bank would
be liable for defalcation if the funds were lost even though he did
not intend to lose the funds. The last scenario given, where the
trustee took the money and ran, would be considered fraud since he
intended the act and the consequences of the act.
Reading defalcation to require intent to do the inappropriate
251. Kawaauhau, 523 u.s. at 64.
252. In re Johnson, 691 F.2d 249, 255 (6th Cir. 1982). See also In re Baylis, 313
F.3d at 17 ("Defalcation is to be measured objectively.").
253. Johnson, 691 F.2d at 257.
254. Id. at 256-57.
255. See supra Introduction.
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act rather than to intend the harmful consequences is also fitting in
light of legislative history that exists with respect to amendments to
§ 523(a)(4), which suggests that the exception is a compromise be
tween the House bill and the Senate amendment. 256 While misap
propriation is no longer in the wording of § 523(a)(4) itself,
legislative history states that this section is intended to "except[]
debts for fraud incurred by the debtor while acting in a fiduciary
capacity or for defalcation, embezzlement, or misappropriation."257
The contemporaneous House Report indicates that § 523(a)(4) ex
cepts debt for embezzlement or larceny and that "intent is to in
clude . . . debts . . . which the debtor willfully and maliciously
intends to borrow for a short period of time with no intent to inflict
injury but on which injury is in fact inflicted."258 This statement
also suggests that Congress anticipated some level of intent in doing
the act to be required by § 523(a)(4),259 even if the specific injury is
not intended.

F.

Which Level of Intent Should Be Applied?

After determining that intent should be required on the part of
the debtor committing the defalcation, it is proper to discuss which
level of intent should be applied to § 523(a)(4). The court in In re
Baylis suggested that the level of intent should be "closer to fraud,
without ... meeting a strict specific intent requirement."26o In ar
ticulating this standard, the First Circuit determined that where the
fiduciary in question "used reasonable care" in his role as a co-trus
tee, he was not liable for defalcation. 261 It also found that the
debtor, in using trust assets to pay for his own legal defense, acted
256. 8 NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW & PRACTICE 2D, 11 U.S.C. § 523 Debtor's Du
ties and Benefits (2003). The Editor's Comments state that § 523(a)(4) is a compromise
between HR 8200 and S 2266. S 2266 excepted "fraud while acting in a fiduciary capac
ity, defalcation, embezzlement or misappropriation." However, an earlier version of S
2266 was similar to HR 8200, and only referred to embezzlement or misappropriation.
257. S. REP. No. 95-989, at 79 (1978). See also 11 U.S.c. § 523(a) (2000) (noting
also that the placement of "fiduciary capacity" differs from that of the actual text of the
statute).
258. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 364 (1977).
259. This also supports the idea that § 523(a)(4) is a fault-based exception.
260. In re Baylis, 313 F.3d 9, 18-19 (1st Cir. 2002).
261. Id. at 22. The court determined that the debtor, acting as a co-trustee, was
obligated "to use reasonable care to prevent a co-trustee from committing a breach of
the trust." Id. However, it also stated that "'[r]easonableness,' ... is not the test for
whether a breach is a defalcation, but if the trustee acted reasonably, there is no defal
cation." Id. See also id. at 23 (stating that the debtor's judgments in dealing with his co
trustee "were flawed and clearly negligent, but not so reckless as to rise to the level of
fault needed to constitute defalcation").
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with "extreme[] reckless[ness] ... in light of his duty of loyalty,"
thus making him liable for defalcation. 262 In Moreno,263 Bennett,264
and Schwager,265 the Fifth Circuit defined defalcation as a "willful
neglect of duty, even if not accompanied by fraud or embezzle
ment,"266 and said the "willful neglect" standard was "a standard of
recklessness."267
A "willful neglect" standard is consistent with the fresh start
policy. Reading "defalcation" in a narrow sense, it requires more
than mere negligence or mistake. It is consistent with Central Han
over, in that a willful neglect standard would require less intent
than fraud, which requires actual intent. 268 Since actual intent re
quires the actor to intend the consequences of his actions, this will
ful neglect standard is also consistent with the notion that
defalcation requires only intent to commit the act itself and not to
intend the outcome. 269 It is consistent with the facts of the defalca
tion cases where the court said that mere negligence or mistake is
sufficient because, even in those cases, "there is generally some ap
pearance of wrongdoing within the facts of each such case."270
CONCLUSION

In light of the fresh start policy, requiring an interpretation
favoring the debtor, exceptions for discharge should be construed
narrowly so as not to frustrate this primary objective of bankruptcy
law. A rule that mere negligence or mistake may constitute a defal
cation while acting in a fiduciary capacity would contrast with this
ideal. Therefore, it is appropriate to require a debtor acting in a
fiduciary capacity to intend to commit a defalcation if his or her
262. Id. at 22.
263. In re Moreno, 892 F.2d 417, 421 (5th Cir. 1990).
264. In re Bennett, 989 F.2d 779 (5th Cir. 1993).
265. Id. at 184 (the debtor was the managing partner of a partnership that
stopped making payments on a note after financing its purchase of property with a
loan).
266. Id. at 790.
267. Id. at 185. See also In re Gaubert, 149 B.R. 819, 827 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1992)
(stating that the definition of "willful neglect" is not clear but has been stated to "im
pose a standard of recklessness" or is "understood to refer to conduct that is not merely
negligent").
268. See Schwager, 121 F.3d at 185 (citing Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust v. Herbst,
93 F.2d 510, 512 (2d Cir. 1937» (stating that defalcation requires a lesser standard than
fraud). See also BARRON'S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1996) (defining intent as "a state
of mind wherein the person knows and desires the consequences of one's own act").
269. See supra discussion in lILE (Intent to do the Act).
270. In re Martin, 161 B.R. at 677.

2005]

THE DEFALCATION EXCEPTION TO DISCHARGE

131

debt will be denied discharge per § 523(a)(4). However, this re
quirement of intent should apply only to the act bringing about the
consequence, rather than to the consequence itself, thus making the
exception distinguishable from the § 523(a)(6) exception for willful
or malicious injury to property. In conclusion, the "willful neglect"
standard adopted by the Fifth Circuit most appropriately complies
with bankruptcy's policy of providing a "fresh start to the honest
debtor" while distinguishing the § 523(a)(4) exception from
§ 523(a)(6) and should be adopted as the standard of intent re
quired for "defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity."
Andrea Johnson

